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We challenge the common wisdom that the Great Recession has produced radical changes in 
political behavior. Accordingly, we assess the extent to which the crisis has spurred protest 
activities and given socioeconomic issues a higher saliency in public debates. We also assess 
how far the crisis has provided a more prominent place for economic and labor actors as 
subject actors, a more prominent place of economic and labor actors as object-actors, as well 
as a more prominent place of economic and labor actors as addressees in claims-making on 
the economic crisis. Our findings show that the crisis has not produced such radical changes 
in all these aspects, although it had some impact. At a more general level, our analysis 
unveils the normative underpinnings of the commonly held view that the economic crisis has 
fed a grievance-based conflict between capital and labor going beyond specific patterns and 
configurations in each country. 
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Desafiamos la concepción general que la Gran Recesión ha generado cambios radicales en 
la conducta política. Por lo tanto, analizamos el grado en el que la crisis ha provocado 
manifestaciones y dado mayor prioridad a los problemas socioeconómicos en los debates 
públicos. De igual manera, analizamos en qué medida la crisis económica ha dado mayor 
prominencia a los actores económicos y laborales como actores sujeto-objeto, así como una 
mayor prominencia a estos actores como recipientes de declaraciones políticas en la crisis 
económica. Nuestros resultados sugieren que la crisis no ha provocado cambios radicales en 
estos aspectos, aunque si ha tenido un impacto. A un nivel más general, nuestro análisis 
revela los principios normativos de la concepción que sostiene que la crisis económica ha 
alimentado el conflicto entre el trabajo y el capital sin tomar en cuenta los patrones y 
configuración específica de cada país.  
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A lot has been said and written about the impact of the Great Recession on European society 
and politics. The most common storyline striking the attention of scholars of political 
behavior is that the crisis has brought about a huge rise of anti-austerity protest movements 
(Ancelovici, Dufour, and Nez 2016; della Porta 2014; della Porta and Mattoni 2014; Gamson 
and Sifry 2013; Pickerill and Krinsky 2012). In this article we are interested in assessing the 
political effects of the crisis on the political mobilization of Europeans, looking more 
specifically at the effects on how main organized actors intervene in the public domain. 
Concerning the collective responses to the crisis in the public domain, according to the 
common storyline one would expect some endemic spreading of contentious politics, with a 
steep growth of protest as opposed to other forms of intervention and a higher salience of 
socioeconomic issues. 
This study challenges the common wisdom that the Great Recession has produced 
radical changes in terms of political behavior and more specifically in terms of a rise in 
protest actions. In arguing that a strong competitive bias has been placed at the core of main 
normative understandings of democracy, we expect that the common storyline about the 
dramatic impact of the economic crisis in fact overstates its real impact, at least as far as 
contentious dynamics are concerned. We thus unveil the normative bias that dramatizes the 
conflict between contrasting interests at stakes during the crisis, thereby “demystifying” the 
idea that major changes have been produced in the ways issues are debated in the public 
domain, in the place of different actors, and the ways these latter intervene. 
Our analysis proposes an alternative account that retrieves the importance of national 
politics in terms of structures, actors, and strategic interventions. Inspired by the literature on 
the role of national political opportunity structures for the mobilization of social movements, 
we examine the extent to which the Great Recession has impacted on the political claims 
making of collective actors in different countries. In particular, we pay special attention on 
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economic actors (such as banks and financial/investment institutions, credit rating agencies, 
private companies, and employers’ organizations) and labor actors (such as unions, workers 
and employees, and other work-related organizations). These two types of organized actors 
arguably have the most contrasting interests and stakes on the socioeconomic dimension of 
the political space, but especially so in periods characterized by economic recession and 
financial hardship. It is in such difficult times that policy making must be shaped in a way to 
counter the negative effects of the crisis. In this context of high competition among 
contrasting interests, economic and labor actors will likely clash with policy makers and 
among each other. Accordingly, we assess the extent to which the crisis has not only spurred 
protest activities and given socioeconomic issues a higher saliency in public debates, but also 
provided a more prominent place for economic and labor actors as subject actors, a more 
prominent place of economic and labor actors as object-actors, as well as a more prominent 
place of economic and labor actors as addressees in claims-making around issues pertaining to 
the economic crisis. To do so, we examine whether and how claims-making over the 
economic crisis has changed over time, as the crisis unfolded and reached its peak, and across 
countries, as not all countries were equally affected by the crisis. We do so through the 
analysis of press coverage of political claims made by collective actors in nine European 
countries: France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. 
National Political Opportunity Structures and Claims-Making over the Economic Crisis 
Since 2008, the dramatic impact of the Great Recession has been discussed 
extensively in public and political debates. The most common storyline is that the crisis has 
deep—and perhaps longstanding—economic effects which can be felt at different levels 
beyond economics: socially first of all, through an increase of precarity in the labor market, a 
weakening of the position of the middle class, the strengthening of inter-generational conflict 
and the loosening of social bonding in general (Fraser 2015; Palier 2014; Stiglitz 2015); but 
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also politically, through the increasing clash between the winners and the losers of the crisis, 
the emergence of new populist parties, the failure of citizenship regimes of integration and, 
most importantly for this article, the rise of anti-austerity protest movements (Bermeo and 
Bartels 2014; Giugni and Grasso 2015; Kriesi and Pappas 2015). 
This article aims to assess the political effects of the Great Recession on claims-
making over the economic crisis and, more specifically, its effects on the role of economic 
and labor organizations therein. Do we observe an increase in protests since the start of the 
crisis, as many scholars and pundits have argued? Are socioeconomic issues more visible 
owing to their centrality for economic and labor organizations? How did these actors address 
the crisis in the public domain? Have economic and labor actors become more central in 
public debates at some stage and in some country in particular? 
The fact that legal norms, institutional structures and practices, as well as discourse, 
vary from country to country is a key element in our comparative approach. On the one hand, 
our alternative account is inspired by the political process approach to social movements and, 
more specifically, by political opportunity theory (see, for reviews, Kriesi 2004; Meyer 2004). 
According to this theory, the specific national configurations of political institutions and 
alignments go a long way in explaining the rise and decline of social movements as well as 
the forms the take. In other words, this approach stresses the impact of national traditions and 
structures. Yet it should be emphasized that we engage with political claims making more 
generally and not only with social movements and protest activities (Giugni 2010; Koopmans 
et al. 2005). Political opportunity theory has stressed the role of the broader institutional 
context for the emergence, mobilization, and outcomes of social movements. Cross-national 
studies have shown how the level and forms, but also the effects of movements are strongly 
contingent upon the existence of favorable—often the term “open” is used—political 
opportunity structures (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995). Furthermore, the opening up of 
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“windows of opportunities” has been shown to be critical to explaining the ebbs and flows of 
protest over time (Tarrow 1989, 2011).  
On the other hand, a number of scholars have introduced the idea that political 
opportunities also have a more informal, symbolic, and discursive side, in addition to their 
formal and institutional side. Works in the field of migration and ethnic relation politics, in 
particular, have stressed how citizenship models may affect the mobilization of migrants and 
more generally claims making in this field not only through their formal side, but also and 
perhaps above all thanks to their discursive side (Cinalli and Giugni 2013b, 2011; Giugni and 
Passy 2004; Koopmans and Statham 1999; Koopmans et al. 2005). As such, they provide 
different degrees of visibility, resonance, and legitimacy to certain actors and issues in the 
public domain, which in turn opens up or closed down opportunities for mobilization by 
migrants, or other claimants in other fields.1 
Here we follow up on this line of reasoning by considering how national public 
discourses may have their own logic that make a homogeneous impact of the economic crisis 
quite unlikely. In other words, in addition to the constraining and channeling role of national 
institutional structures, specific national “discursive structures” should also go against the 
expectations of the standard storyline about the impact of the economic crisis on political 
claims making. Hence, the study of the political, legal, and administrative contexts of 
opportunity structures goes side by side with the study of discursive constructions that actors 
contribute to shape through their interventions in the public domain. These discursive 
interventions play a crucial role in our research since their analysis can also be useful to seize 
the broader importance of communicative tools of expressions passing through symbols, 
narratives, rhetoric, and so forth. Therefore, according to our account, the public domain is 
shaped according to specific settings in each country, and what we observe since the crisis 
                                                        
1  See Giugni (2010) for claims making in the unemployment field. 
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may very much be influenced by the variation of these cross-national settings. In stronger 
terms, we expect that the crisis, which certainly had a number of social and political 
consequences such as for example the rise of populist parties or their strengthening, did not 
have a direct effect on the structuring of public debates, even when dealing with most 
conflictual interests by, and over, economic and labor organizations, respectively. 
Behind our specific interest in “demystifying” the most common account of the impact 
of the Great Recession on political claims making lies a more general issue with which we 
would like to engage. We refer to a number of potential misunderstandings that are grounded 
on a far too competitive conception of politics. Paradoxically, this competitive conception is 
shared across a wide spectrum of normative accounts, linking the neo-liberal perspective on 
the one pole to the neo-Marxist perspective on the other (Engelmann 2003; Gagnier 1997; 
Jaret 1983; Therborn 1986; Touraine 1971). Grounded across both poles, one finds the 
traditional idea that that conflict is an inherent characteristic of humans. View from this 
perspective, the homo economicus has not evolved that much from its original wolf nature, 
since he is still sufficiently unsophisticated to put his particular interest (whether individual or 
class-based) before “the force of better argument” to the advantage of all (Habermas 1984). 
This normative bias is based on a conflictual dogma that in fact prevents any view on 
alternative dynamics in the political domain whereby actors prefer to listen carefully and to be 
responsive to what other actors have to say so as to agree on decisions that may be better for 
all and hence produce a number of normatively desirable consequences (Delli Carpini, Lomax 
Cook, and Jacobs 2004; Fishkin 1995; Mendelberg 2002; Searing et al. 2007). An additional 
risk is that this conflictual dogma does not only remain just at the basis of a general notion of 
politics, but spills over an unlimited number of specific political fields that are only 
considered for their conflictual dynamics. To name just a few most recent examples: the 
refugee crisis has reinforced the idea that migrants’ claims are necessarily in opposition to 
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citizens’ rights; the malfunctioning of the labor market have encouraged the cutting of 
workers’ rights since these latter are allegedly in conflict with the rights of the unemployed; 
the defense of industrial facilities (and their employees) is resisted by those who put first the 
protection of the environment. This understanding of politics as a permanent conflict has 
spread as far as permeating the relationship between parents and their children—characterized 
by inter-generational scars and warfare (Binney and Estes 1988; Clark, Georgellis, and Sanfey 
2001; Heckmann and Borjas 1981)—as well as the demise of welfare in the conflict between 
beneficiaries on the one hand and decision makers on the other (Castles 2004; Cinalli and 
Giugni 2013a; Esping-Andersen 1996; Hubert 2010; Kuhnle 2000). 
Scholars of contentious politics have no doubt embraced such a conflictual bias of 
politics. Since their seminal steps (Eisinger 1973; McAdam 1986; Tarrow 1989; Tilly 1978), 
they have chosen to focus on most conflictual moments throughout history by putting the 
opposition between challengers and insiders at the core of their accounts of social movements 
and political behavior. This focus on a challengers/insiders cleavage has served quite well the 
purpose of building up high levels of sophistication in the analysis of collective mobilization, 
leading to the most accomplished elaborations in the field (Kriesi et al. 1995; Tilly and 
Tarrow 2007). Yet some scholars have grown unsatisfied with this heuristic and have 
approached differently social movements and collective mobilizations (Cinalli 2003, 2004; 
Cinalli and Fuglister 2008; Diani 1992, 1995; Diani and McAdam 2003; Fillieule 2005; 
Hayes 2005). In line with these crucial developments, our effort to unveil the true extent of 
conflict around the interests of capital and labor respectively at the time of the Great 
Recession should be seen as an attempt to deal with new challenges facing contemporary 
examinations of contentious politics, and democracy more generally. Simply put, our analysis 
aims to offer a more realistic representation of diachronic and cross-national variations of 
political contention, as it has given substance to the greatest crisis Europe has seen since 
Collective Responses to the Economic Crisis 
9 
 
 
 
 
WWII. In particular, our diachronic consideration of nine European countries allows for 
appraising whether their large variations in institutional, policy, and discursive approaches 
identify some clear patterns in terms of the claims making of, and over, economic and labor 
organizations.   
To sum up, a major added value of this study, we hope, consists in challenging 
common accounts of the impact of the Great Recession on public debates in Europe based on 
a political opportunity approach, while opening a broader reflection about the role of capital 
and labor in times of economic crisis. Empirically, this translates into a diachronic 
comparison of economic actors and labor actors in nine European countries. As 
representatives of capital and labor respectively, these two types of collective actors arguably 
have different interests and stakes in general, but especially so in periods characterized by 
economic recession and financial hardship. It is in such difficult times that decision makers 
must adopt policies aimed at countering the negative effects of the crisis, and this is where 
economic and labor actors are expected to disagree. During the Great Recession policies have 
been the same virtually everywhere in Europe: strong cuts in government spending—
especially in the social sector—accompanied by an increase in taxation. In short, European 
governments have responded to the crisis through austerity policies. Whatever the account of 
competitive politics being taken as a normative guide, economic and labor actors are expected 
to have a different stance towards such measures. 
Data and Methods 
The data used in this article comes from a systematic content analysis of newspapers 
in each of the countries under study. Following the methods of political claims making 
analysis (Koopmans and Statham 1999) which has proved fruitful in previous work on social 
movements and contentious politics, we have created a comparative dataset by random 
sampling about 1000 claims per country (for a total sample of 9033 claims) selected from five 
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newspapers in each country and covering the period from 2005 to 2014 (in Greece and Poland 
the number of newspapers have been reduced for practical reasons). The choice of newspapers 
has followed from the need to insure as much as possible a representative and unbiased 
sample. Therefore, we have included both “quality” broadsheet newspapers and more tabloid-
oriented newspapers. Furthermore, we have considered newspapers from different political 
orientations as well as more “neutral” newspapers. All articles containing any of the three 
words “crisis,” “recession, or “austerity” have been selected and coded, to the extent that they 
referred to the current economic crisis. The articles have been sampled from all newspaper 
sections, excluding editorials, through key words search. In this paper we only use the claims 
that occurred between 2008 and 2014. The year 2008 can be considered as the start of the 
economic crisis in Europe, although the true beginning varies from one country to the other 
and the financial crisis took place one year earlier. 
We show support to our argument in a simple way, by means of analysis in the form of 
frequencies and cross-tabulations. We show two types of tables: by year and by country. The 
former is meant to address the commonly held hypothesis that the crisis matters on a number 
of aspects relating to public interventions about the economic crisis (if the hypothesis is true, 
we should observe strong variations over time in those aspects since the start of the crisis); the 
latter aims to show that what matters are in fact national traditions and political opportunity 
structures (if our argument is correct, we should observe strong cross-national variations that 
are independent from the crisis). We examine in particular five main aspects of claims: the 
share of protest events over all claims bearing on issues pertaining to the economic crisis; the 
share of socioeconomic issues, as opposed to other issues; the share of labor and economic 
organizations as subject actors, as opposed to other subject actors; the share of labor and 
economic organizations as object actors, as opposed to other actors; the share of labor and 
economic organizations as addressees, as opposed to other actors. We look at all these aspects 
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both over time and across nine countries: France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. 
Findings 
Our analysis proceeds in two steps: in a first step, we look at changes over time in the 
five aspects of claims mentioned earlier; then, in a second step, we look at how these aspects 
vary across countries. The first step provides us with a general overview of how public 
debates about the crisis have unfolded during the Great Recession, whereas the second step 
allows us to tackle more directly the role of national contexts and traditions. For both types of 
analysis, we show the coefficients of associations (Cramer’s V) as well as their significance 
level. 
Table 1 shows the changes over time, from 2008 to 2014. To start with, let us look at 
the share of protest actions (first row), which is the most relevant aspect in a political 
opportunity perspective. Pundits and scholars alike have often stressed the fact that the 
economic crisis has spurred a wealth of protest across Europe, especially in those countries 
most severely affected by its negative consequences. In the social movement literature, this 
view is often associated with grievance-based theories of collective behavior (see Buechler 
2004). Overall, however, our data suggest that this is at best only partly true. First, the overall 
level of protest is quite limited, never exceeding 8 percent of all claims. This rejoins Bermeo 
and Bartels’ (2014) argument that we tend to overstate the amount of protest spurred by the 
crisis because certain major events, such as the large Indignados demonstrations in the 
Summer of 2011 or Occupy Wall Street in the Fall of the same year, have made the front page 
of the news, giving the idea of a much larger protest wave than it actually was. Thus, different 
types of actors have reacted to the crisis more often through other means, namely by means of 
verbal claims. Second, while from 2008 to 2012 the share of protest actions over all claims 
bearing on issues pertaining to the crisis went up, producing a sort of inverse u-shaped 
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distribution with the subsequent decline, the increase is relatively limited. As for most of the 
aspects examined here, differences from one year to the other are statistically significant, but 
the low Cramer’s V suggests a weak relationship between the share of protests and the year. 
Table 1 about here 
Others have argued that it is not so much the extent of the crisis and the grievances it 
produced that has led to mass protest, but rather the austerity measures implemented in most 
European country (Bermeo and Bartels 2014). This seems a more plausible view as the 
highest share of protests occurred in 2011 and 2012, which is when austerity policies were 
fully implemented throughout the whole Europe. Again, however, the evidence suggests that 
such an impact is at best a moderate one. 
Moving to the content of claims (second row), we can see that, overall, more than half 
of all claims deal with socioeconomic issues. In other words, during the crisis, and especially 
so at its peak in 2011, attention was directed to issues pertaining to macroeconomics, labor 
and employment, social policy, and economic activities and domestic commerce. Of these, the 
lion’s share is taken by macroeconomic issues (about half of all claims). While we cannot see 
the thematic focus of claims before the crisis as well as beyond the general reference to it, we 
observe a relative stability during the period under study, that is, during the crisis itself. Yet, 
just as for protest actions, we also observe a slight increase from 2008 to 2011, followed by an 
equally slight decline afterwards. Again, the findings data are far from being conclusive in 
one direction or the other. 
The next six analyses all deal with the two more specific actors we would like to zoom 
in on: economic and labor organizations respectively. The first two analyses consider them as 
subject actors, that is, as makers of claims (third and fourth rows). As we said earlier, one may 
expect these two actors to have played an increasingly important role in public debates during 
the economic crisis as they are most directly concerned by it, although for different reasons. 
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Concerning the former, our data show exactly the opposite: a steady decline over time in the 
share of economic organizations as subject actors. Their overall presence is high (about 27 
percent of all claims), but it is much higher in 2008 than in 2014. Thus this type of actor 
becomes less rather than more visible during the crisis. As for labor actors, we observe a 
rather stable distribution over time. They become a little more present in 2009 and 2010, but 
then their presence goes down again. Moreover, their role in claims making is much less 
prominent that that of economic actors.2 
These patterns are quite similar to those observed when we look at economic and labor 
organizations as object actors (fifth and sixth row), that is, when they are the actors “at stake” 
in claims making rather than the active protagonists of claims. Here too, economic actors are 
much more prominent than labor actors (34 percent, respectively; 13 percent of all claims). 
Most importantly, the share of economic organizations as object actors displays a steady 
decline from 2008 to 2014, with a particularly pronounced fall in 2009, when the crisis was 
starting to make their negative effects visible to everybody. Also, similarly to what we 
observed for subject actors, the share of labor organizations as object actors is quite stable 
over time. Perhaps the only single exception is an important increase in 2009, suggesting that, 
precisely when the crisis started to become visible to all, labor actors were often mentioned as 
objects of claims. 
Finally, we can also look at economic and labor organizations as addressees (seventh 
and eighth row), that is, when standing out in their quality of actors to whom a claim is 
explicitly addressed, and more broadly speaking, the actors whom the claim makers refer to. 
Once again, overall economic actors are more often mentioned as addressees than labor 
actors, although both at a much lower level than when they are mentioned as subject actors or 
                                                        
2 If we look at protest actions only, however, labor actors are more present (38 percent, respectively; 
10 percent of all claims) owing to the mobilization role played by unions and the labor movement 
more generally. 
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as object actors.3 The diachronic trend for both actors is also in line with previous 
observations (even if less pronounced), that is, a declining trend for economic organizations 
and a relatively stable trend stability for labor organizations. 
Table 2 shifts the analysis to cross-national comparisons and shows, for all the same 
aspects, whether and to what extent the claims vary across countries. Let us start once again 
with the form of claims and more specifically on the share of protest actions as compared to 
all other forms (first row). Cross-national variations are striking, as witnessed by the relatively 
high Cramer’s V. The share of protests ranges from 12 percent in France and 11 percent in 
Italy to as low as less-than-one percent in Sweden. These differences might suggest that this 
has something to do with the severity of the economic crisis as the former countries were 
deeply affected while the latter was only marginally or not at all so. Yet, if we look at the 
distributions in other countries, we see that Greece, the most deeply affected country by the 
economic crisis, displays a lower share of protests than both France and Italy. Spain has also a 
much lower share of protest actions compared to France, notwithstanding the fact that France 
buffered the negative effects of the crisis to a greater extent.4 
Table 2 about here 
At first glance, what seems to be at work here is that countries with a traditional 
structure of political opportunities favoring mass protest, such as France, show a higher share 
of protests than countries that have a structure of political opportunities unfavorable to mass 
                                                        
3 The lower share of claims that have the two types of actors as addresses, as compared to the 
distributions concerning subject actors and object actors, can also be explained by the fact that subjects 
and objects are always coded (while the addresses are not). In other words, all claims must by 
definition have a subject actor and an object actor, but they do not necessarily have an addressee (for 
example, in occasion of many claims not asking someone to act in any way). 
4 Based on common knowledge of the situation of our nine countries as well as on contextual data 
collected in the LIVEWHAT project (most notably, on indicators of economic recession), we can 
consider Greece, Italy, and Spain as belonging to the countries that have suffered by a deep economic 
crisis; Germany, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland as belonging to the countries that have not; and 
France and Great Britain as belonging to the countries that standing somewhere in between. This is 
admittedly a bit of a rough way to classify our countries, but it will give some hints as to whether the 
severity of the crisis has an impact on the ways in which organized actors intervene in the public 
domain and therefore on the structuring of the discursive field around the issue of the economic crisis. 
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protest, such as Switzerland. That is, political opportunities seem to play a stronger role than 
the impact of the severity of either the economic crisis or the austerity measures implemented 
by governments to deal with it. More plausibly, however, an interaction among the two 
factors is probably at work here: the crisis, along with austerity measures as a response to it, 
spur protests especially in countries that have a structure of political opportunities favoring a 
strong protest. 
A similar remark applies to the share of claims dealing with socioeconomic issues 
(second row). As we have already seen, these types of issues are quite prominent in public 
debates during the period under study. Yet they are more so in some countries than in others. 
For example, they take the lion’s share in Great Britain, France, and Sweden, while they are 
much less visible especially in Spain and Switzerland. Each country has its own—nationally 
based—public debates and is characterized by a specific public sphere. It is not our goal here 
to explain or even describe in detail these national specificities. What matters for the purpose 
of this article is that we observe strong and significant variations across countries, suggesting 
that national characteristics are a crucial factor for the structuring of public debates dealing 
with the economic crisis. 
Similar and sometimes even stronger variations can be observed when we look at 
economic and labor organizations as subject actors (third and fourth row), as object actors 
(fifth and sixth row), and as addressees (seventh and eighth row). Again without going into 
the details, we observe strong cross-national variations, as attested by the relatively high 
Cramer’s V. In this regard, the share of economic organizations both as subject actors and as 
object actors display the strongest coefficients of all eight aspects that we are considering 
here, hence the deepest differences across countries. 
Most importantly, once again, these cross-national variations do not seem to be linked 
to the impact of the crisis as they often crisscross the distinction between countries deeply 
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affected by the crisis and countries that have been less so. For example, economic 
organizations as subject actors are most present in Sweden and least present in Greece and 
Spain, but at the same time they are relatively prominent in Italy; the share of labor 
organizations as subject actors is similarly low in Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland, while it is 
much higher in France and Italy; economic organizations as object actors are often mentioned 
in Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Sweden, while they are much less often so in Spain; the 
share of labor organizations as object actors is relatively high and very similar in Greece and 
Italy, while it is much lower in Germany, Spain, and especially Great Britain; economic 
organizations as addressees are quite present in Germany, Italy and Poland, less in the other 
countries; finally, labor organizations as addresses have some place in France, Greece, and 
Italy, less in the other countries. 
To stress our point further: these differences might have something to do with the 
crisis (we cannot exclude this with the present analysis), but they seem more plausibly linked 
to specific nationally-based structures of political and discursive opportunities, besides other 
potential factors, such as the types of industrial relations, policy networks, national traditions 
of mobilization and protest policing, and so forth. In fact, each aspect considered depends on 
a configuration of different factors at the national level. Besides the fact that variations across 
countries in the eight aspects of claims examined crosscut the distinction between countries 
deeply affected by the crisis and countries less deeply affected, a further indication that 
national  structures “weigh” to a greater extent than the progression of the crisis is given by 
the coefficients of association (Cramer’s V) between the eight aspects and the year (table 1), 
on the one hand, and those between the same eight aspects and the countries, on the other. 
The latter are systematically higher than the former. 
The main lesson to be drawn from this simple analysis is two-fold. On the one hand, 
contrary to common knowledge, during the Great Recession protests have not increased 
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dramatically, nor have socioeconomic issues increased in public debates. Similarly, there has 
been no relevant growth in the role of economic and labor organizations, neither as makers of 
claims nor as objects or addresses. The role of economic actors, in fact, has rather become less 
prominent. On the other hand, we observe strong cross-national variations in the forms, issues 
and actors (focusing specifically on economic and labor actors) of claims. Furthermore, such 
variations are not necessarily related to the extent or severity of the economic crisis, nor to the 
extent or severity of austerity measures. Rather, structures of political and discursive 
opportunities, together with other potential national-based factors specific to each country, are 
likely to account for much of the variation that exist in the forms, issues, and actors of claims 
pertaining to the economic crisis. Just as governmental responses to the economic crisis 
reflect the interests and power of domestic actors as well as external constraints and the nature 
of the economic problems at hand (Pontusson and Raess 2012), responses by collective actors 
are also deeply embedded in preexisting national structures and traditions. 
Conclusion 
In this article we have challenged a commonly hold view about the impact of the Great 
Recession on public debates and collective mobilizations in Europe. According to this view, 
the extent and severity of the economic crisis has produced major changes in the ways issues 
are debated in the public domain, in the place of different actors, especially economic and 
labor actors, and the ways they intervene. Drawing upon an original dataset made of a random 
sample of political claims in nine European democracies, we have proposed an alternative 
account inspired by the political process approach to social movements and more specifically 
on political opportunity theory.  
Overall, our research has identified three major objectives – empirical, theoretical, and 
normative—that are linked to three deficits in the current discussions around the Great 
Recession. Firstly, we developed a context-sensitive analysis of the impact of the economic 
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crisis on public debates about the crisis in terms of protest actions, socioeconomic issues, and 
with a particular focus on the role of economic and labor organizations. These two actors have 
traditionally been identified by previous research as those conflicting actors that are most 
likely clashing with each other owing to their affiliation to capital and labor respectively. 
Secondly, we stressed the role of national political opportunity structures to explain why we 
observe more important variations across countries than over time. According to our 
argument, the public domain is structured according to the specific national settings of 
institutions, policies, and discourse, and what we observe since the crisis is very much 
influenced by these national settings much more than is influenced by changing grievances 
(and consequent policy changes) over time. The opposition between changing grievances on 
the one hand and national contexts on the other is studied through a research design that tests 
the relevance of the former by looking at time differences, and the latter by looking at cross-
country differences. Finally, and more broadly, we have unveiled the normative 
underpinnings of the commonly held view that the economic crisis has fed a grievance-based 
conflict between capital and labor, beyond specific patterns and configurations at the national 
level. Our analysis of the impact that the Great Recession has taken is thus valuable to assess 
the extent to which the traditional interest-based model of contentious politics can still convey 
an effective portrait of the mobilization of economic and labor organizations. This traditional 
model of contentious politics fits the usual approach to politics as a zero-sum game to be 
fought across various cleavages dividing governors and the governed, the included and the 
excluded, challengers and outsiders, and—in this study—economic and labor organizations. 
Far from offering a definitive answer, our findings have provided support for an 
alternative account along our three main objectives. Therefore, our analysis has “demystified” 
the common storyline about the impact of the crisis on political claims making. Empirically, 
we have found that protest against the crisis and austerity policies are not as widespread as the 
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most updated accounts sometimes suggest (Ancelovici, Dufour, and Nez 2016), that 
socioeconomic issues have not become more salient in public debates during the crisis, that 
stronger variations emerge cross-nationally, and that the role of economic and labor 
organizations is far from being more central or more mutually conflictual because of the 
crisis. 
Most crucially, and beyond the empirical analysis of the impact of the economic crisis 
on public debates, we have opened space for a stronger scholarly engagement with current 
evidences suggesting that traditional interest politics and the challengers/insiders’ dynamics at 
the core of standard conceptualizations of contentious politics may no longer have the lion’s 
share for explaining developments in terms of political behavior across many fields of 
politics. We need to work at alternative models of post-contentious politics that may be based 
on alternative accounts of political behavior, for example, when actors aim to produce a better 
collective view to the advantage of all. These new conceptualizations of non-contentious or 
less-than-contentious politics are also valuable to put emphasis on current processes of re-
composition and articulation of contrasting positions across different political fields. Neo-
Marxist and neo-liberal accounts of democracy, albeit moved by opposite desires and 
advocating different predictions, have constructed well-established narratives of politics as the 
main tool by which actors compete and conflict with each other in the name of their particular 
advantage. Yet this dramatization of ubiquitous conflict may be overstated. And even at the 
time of the Great Recession, the “reason of all” may offer an alternative basis for political 
behavior than acting “in my own name.” The Great Recession, far from being the last 
frontline of contentious politics, may be remembered in the future as an epochal moment 
marking the passage to an alternative model of post-contentious politics. 
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Table 1: Changes over Time in Various Aspects of Claims (2008-2014) 
 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Chi2 
Cramer’s V 
p-value 
Share of protest actions 3.12 
(1155) 
5.26 
(1957) 
4.80 
(1187) 
6.00 
(1234) 
7.71 
1063) 
4.10 
(854) 
4.52 
(487) 
28.5531 
0.0600 
0.000 
         
Share of socioeconomic issues 58.16 
(1219) 
60.22 
(2074) 
61.19 
(1260) 
66.31 
(1309) 
61.36 
(1131) 
62.18 
(928) 
61.06 
(511) 
20.1119 
0.0488 
0.003 
         
Share of economic organizations as subject actors 34.84 
(1260) 
28.86 
(2152) 
25.54 
(1308) 
25.35 
(1353) 
23.43 
(1161) 
24.60 
(947) 
19.35 
(522) 
72.2441 
0.0911 
0.000 
         
Share of labor organizations as subject actors 6.19 
(1260) 
8.64 
(2152) 
9.17 
(1308) 
7.10 
(1353) 
8.01 
(1161) 
7.39 
(947) 
7.66 
(522) 
11.2490 
0.0360 
0.081 
         
Share of economic organizations as object actors 45.56 
(1260) 
34.90 
(2152) 
32.95 
(1308) 
30.82 
(1353) 
30.92 
(1161) 
29.36 
(947) 
29.12 
(522) 
101.9803 
0.1082 
0.000 
         
Share of labor organizations as object actors 10.71 
(1260) 
15.61 
(2152) 
12.77 
(1308) 
11.09 
(1353) 
12.58 
(1161) 
11.30 
(947) 
11.49 
(522) 
26.5851 
0.0553 
0.000 
         
Share of economic organizations as addressees 10.16 
(1260) 
12.45 
(2152) 
10.24 
(1308) 
9.16 
(1353) 
9.39 
(1161) 
8.34 
(947) 
8.05 
(522) 
20.6263 
0.0487 
0.002 
         
Share of labor organizations as addressees 1.67 
(1260) 
2.65 
(2152) 
3.36 
(1308) 
1.77 
(1353) 
2.33 
(1161) 
2.75 
(947) 
1.72 
(522) 
12.4892 
0.0379 
0.052 
Note: Number of cases for calculation of percentages between parentheses. 
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Table 2: Cross-National Variations in Various Aspects of Claims (2008-2014) 
 
 FR GE GR IT PL ES SE CH GB Chi2 
Cramer’s V 
p-value 
Share of protest actions 11.56 
(813) 
4.66 
(772) 
6.74 
(920) 
10.93 
(851) 
3.05 
(950) 
4.97 
(865) 
0.71 
(983) 
2.39 
(879) 
2.66 
(939) 
205.8510 
0.1607 
0.000 
Share of socioeconomic issues 76.99 
(778) 
56.33 
(948) 
58.84 
(962) 
57.93 
(946) 
65.34 
(978) 
47.30 
(943) 
70.35 
(968) 
50.41 
(968) 
72.38 
(974) 
314.9799 
0.1929 
0.000 
Share of economic organizations as subject actors 18.77 
(863) 
18.64 
(971) 
12.03 
(989) 
24.77 
(969) 
37.78 
(990) 
12.86 
(1011) 
51.42 
(984) 
35.45 
(976) 
30.15 
(985) 
678.7300 
0.2787 
0.000 
Share of labor organizations as subject actors 13.56 
(863) 
4.12 
(971) 
9.50 
(989) 
14.55 
(969) 
5.15 
(990) 
6.03 
(1101) 
5.18 
(984) 
5.53 
(976) 
7.82 
(985) 
152.9219 
0.1323 
0.000 
Share of economic organizations as object actors 26.65 
(863) 
40.78 
(971) 
24.47 
(989) 
44.07 
(969) 
32.22 
(990) 
10.48 
(1101) 
47.26 
(984) 
35.35 
(976) 
44.77 
(985) 
503.7610 
0.2401 
0.000 
Share of labor organizations as object actors 14.14 
(863) 
8.14 
(971) 
20.32 
(989) 
21.36 
(969) 
13.03 
(990) 
6.73 
(1101) 
10.57 
(984) 
15.98 
(976) 
3.96 
(985) 
252.2039 
0.1699 
0.000 
Share of economic organizations as addressees 7.88 
(863) 
16.89 
(971) 
8.49 
(989) 
14.55 
(969) 
17.07 
(990) 
5.54 
(1101) 
4.98 
(984) 
10.55 
(976) 
5.38 
(985) 
205.9286 
0.1535 
0.000 
Share of labor organizations as addressees 4.29 
(863) 
1.85 
(971) 
5.76 
(989) 
4.02 
(969) 
2.22 
(990) 
1.58 
(1101) 
0.71 
(984) 
0.41 
(976) 
0.81 
(985) 
116.0550 
0.1152 
0.000 
Note: Number of cases for calculation of percentages between parentheses.
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